Defamation Defences
Defence of Truth III
If a statement has multiple meanings, the literal truth of one meaning may not suffice to establish the defence of truth. It cannot be justified on the basis of one meaning if a more serious unjustifiable imputation can be reasonably taken. In common with defamation, generally, the judge decides whether the wording may have defamatory meaning and the jury decides if it does in fact compel.
The repetition of a defamatory statement made by the third party is generally defamatory. In the same way, statements or imputations that a person is suspected or reasonably suspected of something, are not sufficient in themselves to constitute the defence of truth, notwithstanding the suspicions are in fact held. The fact that the police or that persons in authority have reasonable ground for suspicion may be sufficient if reasonable cause can be shown.
Where general accusations are made in relation to a person’s character, it may not be enough to justify them with reference to an instance of the relevant behaviour. It is necessary to show a number of instances of the relevant behaviour, in order to justify a generalised character-based accusation.